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In the early 1980s, the Supreme Court issued a pair of decisions that have served as counterpoints to the narrowing focus of
Flook and Benson. In Diehr,13 the Court held that a process for
molding and curing rubber was patent eligible even though the
process was based around use of the Arrhenius equation. Although
the Court maintained that the equation alone is an abstract idea,
the claimed process was patent eligible because it represented a
practical implementation involving “transforming or reducing an
article to a different state or thing.”14 In Chakrabarty,15 the Court
held that a genetically modiied bacterium was patent eligible. The
decision famously found congressional intent that patent eligibility
includes “anything under the sun that is made by man.”16
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Some History of Patent Eligibility
Patent rights have deep roots in U.S. history. The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to offer inventors “exclusive
Right” to their “Discoveries.”3 Although written well before the
advent of law and economics, this patent and copyright clause
is expressly designed as an incentive structure “to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” After enactment of the
irst Patent Act in 1793,4 Thomas Jefferson took the charge
as the initial patent examiner.5 Elements of the 1793 Act have
remained virtually unchanged over the law’s 220-year reign;
this includes the statutory statement of patent eligibility that is
now found in § 101 of Title 35: “Whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”6 Section 101 is written broadly and
positively and without any express exceptions indicating what
is not patentable. The Supreme Court has illed that gap by barring the patenting of “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas.”7 Those nonstatutory exceptions are, according
to the court, “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none.”8
Contemporary history of these exceptions goes back to
Supreme Court decisions from the 1970s and early 1980s. The
irst two cases—Benson9 and Flook10—both restricted patent eligibility in important ways. Benson held that a process
using electronic “shift registers” to algorithmically convert
numbers from binary-coded decimal to pure binary format
was ineligible because the mathematical formula used is an
abstract idea and—because the process was only practically
useful in a digital computer—the claimed process was seen as
“wholly pre-empt[ing] the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”11 Flook

[T]he discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent
unless there is some other inventive concept in its application. . . . A competent draftsman could attach some form of
post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula; the
Pythagorean theorem would not have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application contained a inal
step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully
applied to existing surveying techniques.12
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also involved a mathematical algorithm—but this time it was
applied to the very particular problem of setting an alarm limit
in a catalytic converter process. As such, there was no question
of broad preemption. Still, the Supreme Court found the patent to be ineligible because the unpatentable algorithm was the
only novel feature of the invention. The Court wrote:
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he past two decades have seen a great rise in the patenting of e-commerce inventions. Now, those same patents are taking an equally great fall. In a series of four
recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has shifted the doctrine of
patent eligibility and, in the process, raised the bar for e-commerce
and software patents—making it more dificult to obtain and
enforce those types of patents. Although there is no afirmative bar
against patenting these business-focused inventions, the expanded
“abstract idea” approach creates signiicant hurdles. Pointedly, if
reviewed under the new doctrine, we expect that several hundred
thousand already-issued patent claims would be found lacking
patentable subject matter. Because the Supreme Court eligibility decisions are applied retroactively to already-issued patents,
the result is that these patents have been implicitly rendered unenforceable. And, in many cases, we would expect that attempts at
enforcement would lead to sanctions or an award of attorneys’
fees.1 This loss of entitlement represents a signiicant inancial
loss for the patent holders. However, Ronald Coase’s work should
remind us that the change creates new value and new entitlements
for those who would use the ideas previously restricted by patent
rights.2 Looking forward, the patent ofice and courts are struggling to apply the new doctrine in a principled manner, while
innovators and operating companies are shifting business plans to
better take advantage of the new regime.

Decision Year

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was formed
by Congress soon after Diehr and Chakrabarty and took on
its appointed role of solidifying and unifying patent law.17 In
that process, the appellate “patent court” latched onto the two
more recent and more expansive Supreme Court cases while
Dennis D. Crouch is an associate professor of law at the University
of Missouri, codirector of the Missouri Center for Intellectual
Property and Entrepreneurship, and coauthor of www.patentlyo.
com. Mitchell L.Terry is a J.D. student with a focus on intellectual
property law at the University of Missouri School of Law.

largely ignoring Benson and Flook.18 Through that process,
the court began allowing the patenting of a wider scope and
variety of software and business methods relating to e-commerce. That approach reached its expanse with the 1998
Federal Circuit opinion in State Street Bank holding that a
data processing system for implementing a particular investment portfolio strategy was patent eligible.19 That decision
also found that business methods are patent eligible:
We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception
to rest. Since its inception, the “business method” exception
has merely represented the application of some general, but
no longer applicable legal principle, perhaps arising out of the
“requirement for invention”—which was eliminated by § 103.
Since the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and
should have been, subject to the same legal requirements for
patentability as applied to any other process or method.20
In the follow-on case of AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, the Federal Circuit took its broad eligibility position a step
further and essentially wrote off the abstract idea test: “the judicially-deined proscription against patenting of a ‘mathematical
algorithm,’ to the extent such a proscription still exists, is narrowly limited to mathematical algorithms in the abstract.”21 With
an expanded eligibility doctrine and explosion of online business
activity, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Ofice began issuing
e-commerce and Internet software related patents in droves—a
process that continued largely unabated for the next decade.
The Newest Quartet of Supreme Court Cases
After a 30-year hiatus, the Supreme Court has again focused its
attention on subject matter eligibility with what has turned into
a second four-part series (with ongoing potential for expansion). The irst of this revival quartet was the 2010 decision in
Bilski v. Kappos.22 Bilski involved a classic business method
patent application, claiming the hedging of risk in a commodity
market that basically operates by initiating a set of transactions with consumers (based on the consumer’s risk position)
and another set of transactions with market participants who
have risk positions counter to the consumers.23 Although the
claims do not expressly require the use of software or computers, many of them—especially those requiring Monte Carlo
simulations—would require such technology in practice. In
reviewing the claimed invention, the Supreme Court found that
Bilski’s method was an abstract idea and therefore not patent
eligible. To reach this conclusion, the Court irst hit the “reset”
button by rejecting the whole of Federal Circuit doctrine on
the topic of patentable subject matter. The Court explained that
“nothing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has used in the past.”24 At the same time, the Court also
rejected calls to create a bright-line ban on e-commerce patents. Instead, the court simply pointed to the aforementioned
cases of Benson, Flook, and Diehr as controlling without further substantive analysis. Four justices refused to join the
majority but instead concurred in judgment—arguing latly that
“business methods are not patentable.”25
The 2012 decision of Mayo v. Prometheus26 did not relate to
e-commerce or software inventions directly, but is important for
the way that it set up the most recent e-commerce decision of

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank.27 In Mayo, the patent at issue related to a
personalized method of iterative drug dosing that required the raising or lowering of the dosage of a particular drug (thiopurine) in
order to reach a known threshold blood level of a speciied metabolite of the drug. In reaching its conclusion that the patent was
improperly directed to a law of nature, the Supreme Court irst
categorized the correlation between metabolite blood level and
an overdose or underdose of thiopurine as an unpatentable law of
nature. As the second step in the analysis, the Court considered
the additional limitations in the claims but found them insuficient to transform the identiied natural law into a patent eligible
process. The opinion repeatedly and favorably cites the had-been
black-sheep Flook case in inding that the physical and transformative elements of the invention were simply postsolution activity
and patent attorney tricks.28 As to the claimed practical application
steps, the Mayo Court found it relevant and important that those
additional steps were already known in the art and thus lacking the
innovative weight necessary for patent eligibility.
The third member of the new quartet is the Myriad Genetics case.29 That case focused on Myriad’s discovery of the
BRCA gene mutations that predict a high likelihood of early
onset breast or cervical cancer in women. In deciding patent eligibility, the Supreme Court held that Myriad’s patented
claims to an “isolated” form of the BRCA gene were ineligible as a product of nature but that a lab-created cDNA version
of the naturally occurring mutant gene was eligible. The
difference, according to the court, was that creation of the
cDNA involved a substantial molecular transformation while
mere isolation of naturally occurring DNA did not. Of course,
the physical transformation that was suficient here is ordinarily lacking in e-commerce inventions.
The inal case in the recent quartet is Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank.30 In Alice, the court took another important step in holding that the two-step approach to patent eligibility applied to
laws of nature in Mayo applies to the abstract idea analysis as
well. Thus, under Alice, the eligibility test begins with a question of whether the patent claim encompasses an abstract idea
and, if so, then asks whether the invention includes an “inventive
concept” suficient to “transform” that abstract idea into a patentable invention.31 In Alice, the Supreme Court particularly held
that transformation is not satisied by the mere recitation of standard computer limitations or other limitations written at a “high
level of generality.”32 The patent at issue in Alice claimed a computer-implemented system for managing settlement risk by using
a third-party intermediary. In rejecting the patent eligibility, the
Court held that the claimed invention was directed to the abstract
idea of intermediated settlement and that the computer-related
elements were claimed at such a high level of generality as to be
insuficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible
invention. Although Alice is still relatively new, dozens of software and business method patents have already been held invalid
based on its new precedential force.
E-Commerce Patents
One way to think through the impact of the new eligibility doctrine is to look back on some well-known e-commerce related
patents and ask whether those patents would still be considered patent eligible. Here, we walk through four examples: the
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inancial services data processing patent from the Federal Circuit’s
1998 State Street Bank decision, Amazon’s “one-click” patent,
Google’s PageRank algorithm, and Apple’s primary patent covering its “slide-to-unlock” feature. Although all four were previously
judged patent eligible, our analysis is that only one remains viable.
Data Processing in State Street Bank
In the early 1990s, Signature Financial obtained a patent covering
a data processing system for a “hub and spoke” inancial services
coniguration.33 This system manages the low of data, and makes
the calculations necessary to run a partnership portfolio holding a set of partnership funds (the hub and spokes respectively).
The particular approach and structure were designed to reduce
potential capital gains tax for the portfolio as a whole. Although
not claimed as a method per se, this patent has been repeatedly
pointed to as a classic business method patent.
In its 1998 decision, the Federal Circuit found the patent
eligible for protection.34 In our hypothetical analysis here, we suggest that the patent no longer passes muster. The irst question
under Alice is whether the patent is directed to an abstract idea.
Although the particular deinition of an abstract idea is not well
expounded, it is fairly easy to characterize the general notion of
structuring a partnership portfolio in a hub-and-spokes mechanism
for tax avoidance as an abstract idea. The tax avoidance structure has much in common with the escrow approach in Alice and
the risk-hedging scheme in Bilski—all of which are essentially
“fundamental economic principles” that cannot be patented. The
particular computer limitations in the Signature Financial patent
require a “processor,” “data storage,” and a way to calculate proits
and losses in the various portions of the system. As in Alice, those
limitations are all claimed at a very high level of generality with
nothing inventive added within those application steps. As such,
they would not be suficient to transform the unpatentable abstract
idea into a patent eligible invention.
Verdict: unpatentable.
Amazon’s One-Click
Amazon’s one-click patent has repeatedly been a point of discussion since its issuance in 1999.35 As the name suggests,
the patent covers a method and system for placing an order
over the Internet using just one “click” of a mouse (a “single
action”). Then in response to the single action, a user’s computer submits a purchase order and a server system brings
in stored information about the user (such as payment and
address information) and begins the fulillment process.36
The abstract idea being claimed here is simply that of making
an order by using a single action. As in the prior cases discussed,
this is an old and common approach in business for an established customer to simply call and order where the customer
already has a payment method on ile and the prices are already
known or negotiated. Amazon’s patent does require user and
server computers, but those were all well known at the time of
Amazon’s invention and are claimed at a high level of generality.
Verdict: unpatentable.
Google’s PageRank
A major aspect of Google’s early search engine success was
its patented PageRank algorithm.37 The general idea was that
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important search information about a page could be derived
based on what others are saying about that page. Using that
principle, the patent claims an iterative method of ranking a
irst document (such as a web page) based on the rank of a set
of other documents linking back to the irst document.
After the decision in Alice, it is dificult to see how this patent
is still valid. In several cases, the Supreme Court has stated that
mathematical algorithms are unpatentable abstract ideas. Here,
the Google patent is directed toward a ranking algorithm that
is, according to the deinition, an abstract idea. Further, the general idea of ranking importance of a work according to its back
citations is also well known in academia. The claim is “computer implemented” but there are no innovative concepts that
rely on that implementation, and the claim only calculates a rank
rather than making any transformation. Thus, there are no additional elements that would transform the abstract algorithm into
a patentable invention. As Alice held, “simply implementing a
mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a computer, is not a patentable application of that principle.”38
Verdict: unpatentable.
Apple’s Slide-to-Unlock
The inal patent that we analyze here can only loosely it
within the e-commerce category. The slide-to-unlock feature
is a well-known aspect of contemporary handheld devices
such as Apple’s iPhone. Apple’s patent covers a device with
a touch screen that can be unlocked via gestures performed
on the touch screen.39 The basic idea is that the device is
unlocked if contact with the display corresponds to a predeined gesture for unlocking the device that includes moving
an unlock image across a touch screen display. The slideto-unlock patent is one of the several patents that Apple has
successfully asserted against Samsung in recent years.
This case is more dificult to it within the Alice model. Certainly, the general idea of a sliding lock is well known and—at
least at that level of generality—could be considered an abstract
idea. However, Apple’s implementation offers signiicantly
more because it is designed to solve a problem speciic to touchsensitive displays. Further, the approach offers a particular
technological solution involving the tracking of a “continuous”
movement on the touch display, linking that to a corresponding
interactive graphical image, and comparing the movement with
a predeined unlock pattern or location set. Thus, this particular
application appears to provide the “something more” required
by Alice, although that term has not been well deined. A court
may question, for instance, whether touch screens were already
so well known by Apple’s 2005 patent application date that they
should be seen as equivalent to general purpose computers.
Verdict: patent eligible.
Conclusion
In the e-commerce realm, the bottom line is that a high percentage of patents issued over the past two decades have been
implicitly rendered invalid by the recent quartet of Supreme
Court subject matter eligibility cases. While parties will still
battle over threshold tests of the meaning of “abstract idea”
and “innovative concept,” there is no question that the bar has
been signiicantly raised. Going forward, we expect business

innovators to forgo patent protection unless their new idea
comes with a strong technological innovation. n
Endnotes
1. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (lowering the standard for awarding attorneys’
fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285).
2. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
Econ. 1 (1960).
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (ratiied 1788).
4. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
5. William I. Wyman, The Patent Ofice and Invention Since
1845: How the Government Has Kept Pace with the Inventor, 112
Sci. Am. 533, 533 (1915).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
7. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
8. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948).
9. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
10. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
11. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72.
12. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590, 594.
13. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
14. Id. at 192.
15. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
16. Id. at 309.
17. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
18. See Dennis Crouch, The Revival of Parker v. Flook, Patently-O
(Oct. 5, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/the-revival-ofparker-v-look.html (diagram reproduced here with permission).
19. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

20. Id. at 1375.
21. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
22. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
23. See U.S. Patent Application No. 60/015,756 (iled Apr. 16,
1996), available at http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2009/08/
bilskiapplication.pdf.
24. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612.
25. Id. at 614 (Stevens, J., concurring).
26. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289 (2012).
27. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347
(2014).
28. See Dennis Crouch, Mayo v. Prometheus: Natural Process
+ Known Elements = Normally No Patent, Patently-O (Mar. 20,
2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/mayo-v-prometheusnatural-process-known-elements-normally-no-patent.html.
29. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
30. Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347.
31. Id. at 2357.
32. Id.
33. U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (iled Mar. 11, 1991).
34. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149
F.3d 1368 (1998).
35. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (iled Sept. 12, 1997).
36. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnobel.com, Inc., 239 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
37. U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (iled Jan. 9, 1998).
38. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347,
2357–58 (2014).
39. U.S. Patent No. 8,046,721 (iled June 2, 2009). Note there are
other related unlock patents.

Relief from administrative tasks
is just steps away

Take advantage of a proven,
notably reliable and easy
procedure for IP recordals
from Dennemeyer & Associates.
Your benefits:
•
•
•
•

Precise and transparent cost estimates
provide an authoritative forecast
Single point of contact eases the process
and reduces your involvement
Expert know-how and a streamlined
workflow secure fast register updates
worldwide
Ready-for-signature powers of attorney and
assignment deeds for all jurisdictions

Contact us now to learn more about your benefits:
info@dennemeyer-law.com
www.dennemeyer.com/recordal-services/

May/June 2015

n

LANDSLIDE

17

